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OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
James Sed appeals his judgment of conviction, claiming
the Pennsylvania State Police violated his Fourth Amendment
rights when they arrested him in Ohio. Sed also claims the
District Court erred when it failed to reduce his sentence
because of “sentencing entrapment” or “sentencing factor
manipulation.”
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I.
In 2006 Sed became the subject of a Pennsylvania State
Police investigation into cocaine trafficking by Mark Grannison.
Believing that Grannison supplied crack cocaine to Sed, the
State Police twice arranged for an informant named Tyrone
Offie to solicit Sed to sell drugs to State Trooper Michael
Poulos, who was acting undercover.
The first controlled purchase occurred on April 21, 2006.
On that date, Sed was traveling by car with his girlfriend, Stacie
Hickman, when they met up with Poulos and Offie, who were
traveling in an unmarked police van. During this initial
meeting, Poulos “fronted” Sed $2400 to purchase two ounces of
cocaine and Sed in turn placed a call to his supplier (Grannison).
Soon after Grannison returned Sed’s phone call, the two
vehicles proceeded to the parking lot of Alisa’s Café in Sharon,
Pennsylvania, very near the Ohio border. Although there had
been discussion about the deal occurring in Trumbull County,
Ohio, Poulos explained to Offie that the recording device they
were using in the investigation was authorized for use only in
Pennsylvania. In response to Poulos’s demand that they remain
in Pennsylvania, Offie told Sed that he refused to enter Ohio
because he was facing criminal charges there. Consequently,
Poulos and Offie waited in the parking lot of Alisa’s Café while
Sed took the $2400 Poulos had given him and rode with
Hickman into Ohio to meet Grannison.
Meanwhile,
Pennsylvania State Troopers monitoring the situation observed
Sed and Hickman meet with Grannison at the South Side Market
in Ohio before returning to Pennsylvania to deliver almost 47.1
grams of crack cocaine to Poulos.
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Six days later, intending to do a “buy bust,” Poulos asked
Sed to meet him at the Shenango Valley Mall in Hermitage,
Pennsylvania so he could buy a larger quantity of crack cocaine.
Unwilling to “front” the $5250 necessary to make the purchase,
Poulos told Sed he wanted to meet Sed’s supplier (Grannison)
at the mall. Sometime after that conversation, Sed called Poulos
and changed the location of the deal to a gas station at the
Hermitage Plaza, a few miles from the Shenango Valley Mall.
In anticipation of the deal, Poulos had assembled a “take-down”
team composed of Pennsylvania State Police and local police
from Sharon, Pennsylvania who stationed themselves near the
gas station to make the arrest. That plan was foiled, however,
when Sed insisted that the deal transpire in the same manner as
the first deal. In light of this change in plans, the take-down
team proceeded to the state line. Some officers established
surveillance at the South Side Market in Ohio where Sed had
met Grannison on April 21, while others watched the parking lot
at Alisa’s Café where Sed had delivered the crack cocaine to
Poulos.
After they left the gas station at the Hermitage Plaza,
Poulos and Offie followed Sed and Hickman to Alisa’s Café.
When they arrived there, Sed exited his vehicle, went to
Poulos’s van, obtained $5230 for the deal1 , and said he would be
right back. Sed and Hickman then drove to the South Side
Market in Ohio to meet Grannison. Before Sed returned with
the crack cocaine, Poulos saw Grannison drive a green Buick

1

Poulos had given Sed $20 for gas money soon after Sed
arrived at the gas station.
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LeSabre into the parking lot of Alisa’s Café to have a look at
Poulos before returning to the South Side Market. Upon
Grannison’s return, Sed entered the green Buick LeSabre, and
the two left the South Side Market. When the police believed
Grannison and Sed had re-entered Pennsylvania, they stopped
Grannison’s car and seized 124 grams of crack cocaine. Sed
was arrested and taken to the Sharon Police Department. It was
later determined that Grannison’s car was stopped in Ohio, less
than one hundred yards from the Pennsylvania border.
II.
Some ten months after the two controlled purchases, a
four-count indictment was filed against Sed, Hickman, and
Grannison. Sed was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute
and possess with the intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more
of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and 846 (Count 1); (2) distribution or
possession with the intent to distribute five (5) grams or more of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); and (3)
possession with the intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more
of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 3).
Before trial, Sed filed a motion to suppress evidence,
claiming the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The District
Court denied Sed’s motion, and the case proceeded to trial by
jury. Sed presented an entrapment defense, testifying that he
had a history as a drug user and was not predisposed to sell
5

drugs, but began selling crack cocaine only after an extended
campaign of harassment by Offie. The jury was unpersuaded
and convicted Sed on all three counts.
Following Sed’s conviction, the Probation Office
prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) which noted
the statutory range for Sed’s crimes of conviction was 120
months to life imprisonment. 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); 21
U.S.C. § 846. The PSR also calculated Sed’s base offense level
at 32 pursuant to § 2D1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG). The PSR recommended a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1, to
which Sed objected.
Consistent with the PSR, the District Court concluded
that Sed “willfully gave false testimony . . . in support of his
entrapment defense.” In the District Court’s view, the “entire
line of testimony” about Offie’s harassment “clearly was
fabricated by defendant to support his defense” because Sed
“doggedly pursued the opportunities to complete the large crack
cocaine transactions . . . .” Based on this conclusion, the District
Court imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of
justice, which raised Sed’s offense level to 34. Sed’s criminal
history category was I, which yielded an advisory Guidelines
range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. Based on Sed’s lack
of history in the drug trade and his relatively minor role in
Grannison’s distribution network, the District Court varied
downward and imposed a 130-month term of incarceration.
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Sed filed this timely appeal. The District Court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
III.
A.
Sed first challenges his conviction, claiming the
Pennsylvania State Police violated his Fourth Amendment rights
when they seized him in Ohio, beyond their jurisdiction. We
review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). We
exercise plenary review of the District Court’s application of the
law to the facts. United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 276 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Relying principally upon two sections of the Uniform
Fresh Pursuit Act, as enacted at Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2935.30 and
2935.31, Sed asserts that his arrest in Ohio by Pennsylvania
police violated Ohio law. Consequently, he argues that evidence
against him must be suppressed because “the concept of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment logically
and necessarily presumes an exercise of lawful authority by a
police officer. The Pennsylvania officers’ flagrant indifference
to their jurisdictional limitations and Ohio’s jurisdictional
prerogatives requires suppression.” This argument is contrary
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Moore, 128 S.Ct.
1598 (2008), which Sed neglects to address in his initial brief or
in his reply brief, despite the Government’s heavy reliance upon
the case.
7

In Moore, police arrested Moore for driving on a
suspended license, even though Virginia law empowered them
to issue only a summons for that offense. Id. at 1601-02. The
question presented to the Supreme Court was “whether a police
officer violates the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest
based on probable cause but prohibited by state law.” Id. at
1601. Like Sed, Moore argued that his arrest in violation of
Virginia law constituted an ipso facto violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting: “A State is
free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of
constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more
restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones
unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.” Id. at 1606. The
Court concluded that “while States are free to regulate . . .
arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the
Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Id. at 1607. In light of
Moore, Sed is plainly wrong when he argues that his arrest in
violation of Ohio law renders the conduct of the State Police
unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.
Our rejection of Sed’s categorical argument is not the end
of the inquiry, however, because we still must determine
whether the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. We review the reasonableness of a seizure under
the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996). Our review of the undisputed facts of this case
leads us to conclude that there was nothing unreasonable about
the Pennsylvania State Police’s seizure of Sed and Grannison,
despite the fact that the arrest occurred in Ohio instead of
Pennsylvania.
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Although Sed was seized outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania State Police, the first controlled
purchase between Sed and Poulos was negotiated and
consummated entirely within Pennsylvania. As for the second
controlled purchase, Poulos requested Grannison’s presence at
the Shenango Valley Mall. When Sed changed the location to
the gas station at the Hermitage Plaza, the “take down” team
assembled nearby and planned to make the arrest there. The
record demonstrates that all state actors believed the second
controlled purchase would occur entirely within Pennsylvania
until Sed insisted that the deal would have to occur in the same
fashion as the first deal six days earlier. Thus, it was only as a
result of this last-minute change of plans by Sed that the second
controlled buy occurred so close to the state line. Even then, the
police intended to arrest Sed in Pennsylvania and believed that
they had done so when they stopped Grannison’s car.
In sum, Sed had committed a serious drug crime in
Pennsylvania and was acting in furtherance of a conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine in Pennsylvania at the time he was
seized. The stop of Grannison’s car before it entered
Pennsylvania was nothing more than an honest mistake and a de
minimis one at that, considering the game of hopscotch
Grannison and Sed played across the Pennsylvania-Ohio border.
This mistake does not render the seizure of Sed unreasonable.
Cf. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398-99 (3d
Cir. 2006) (stating that a reasonable mistake of fact is “rarely
fatal” to the legality of a Terry stop even where the mistake goes
to the question of whether a crime is being committed). Under
these circumstances, the seizure of Sed was not unreasonable
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and the District Court did not err in denying his motion to
suppress evidence.2
B.
Sed also challenges his sentence, claiming the police
entrapped him into selling drugs in amounts beyond what he
what he was predisposed to sell (sentencing entrapment) and
that they unfairly strung out their investigation solely to increase
the quantity of drugs he sold (sentencing factor manipulation).
Absent the entrapment or manipulation, Sed contends his
Guidelines range would have been much lower because the
quantity of drugs he sold would have been substantially smaller.
In reviewing the District Court’s sentence for
reasonableness, United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d
Cir. 2009) (en banc), we examine its factual findings for clear
error, and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 567-68. The
District Court’s finding of fact that Sed perjured himself is
entitled to great deference because “only the trial judge can be
aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear
so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what

2

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that Sed
“concede[d] that probable cause existed for his arrest” before
the District Court. As the Supreme Court noted in Whren v.
United States, the balancing of Fourth Amendment factors is
rarely in doubt when a search or seizure is based on probable
cause. 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996). The facts surrounding Sed’s
seizure do not remotely present such a rare case.
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is said.” United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir.
2000) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575
(1985)).
We have neither adopted nor rejected the doctrines of
sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation. See
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 476 n.13 (3d Cir.
2006); United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 438 (3d Cir. 1994).
Almost all of our sister courts of appeals have opined about both
doctrines, reaching varied conclusions. For example, the Courts
of Appeals for the First, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
adopted sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor
manipulation, but they have disagreed as to whether they are
separate defenses. See United States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d
50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (both are identical, valid defenses); United
States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009) (accepting
sentencing factor manipulation); United States v. Martin, 583
F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009) (accepting sentencing
entrapment, as distinct from manipulation); United States v.
Riewe, 165 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating both defenses
as identical and valid); United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013,
1017-18 (10th Cir. 2009) (accepting both as identical). On the
other hand, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and District of Columbia Circuits have rejected both doctrines.
See United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153-54 (4th Cir.
1994); United States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir.
1995) (rejecting sentencing factor manipulation); United States
v. Snow, 309 F.3d 294, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting sentencing
entrapment); United States v. Guest, 564 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir.
2003). Finally, the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
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Eleventh Circuits have reached mixed results. See United States
v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (sentencing
entrapment valid but sentencing manipulation not); United
States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007)
(sentencing factor manipulation valid but sentencing entrapment
not).
Once again, we need not rule on the legal merits of either
doctrine because Sed cannot establish the requisite factual
predicates for sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor
manipulation. As we shall explain, Sed’s sentencing entrapment
argument fails because the District Court found that Sed
perjured himself when he testified regarding his lack of
predisposition to sell cocaine. Similarly, Sed cannot show
sentencing factor manipulation because the police were not
required to arrest Sed after the first controlled purchase.
Sentencing entrapment, under its most expansive
formulation, “occurs when official conduct leads an individual
otherwise indisposed to dealing in a larger quantity or different
type of controlled substance to do so, and the result is a higher
sentence.” Martin, 583 F. 3d at 1073. Here, the District Court’s
finding of fact that Sed perjured himself with respect to his
predisposition to sell drugs is well supported by the record and
applies with equal force to Sed’s contention that he was
predisposed to sell only small quantities of drugs.
The most glaring example of Sed’s lack of credibility was
his account of his relationship with Offie. Sed testified that
Offie had worked for him previously, but that the two became
estranged some years before the events in question here. Sed
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also testified that after Offie was arrested on drug charges and
became a government informant, Offie sought Sed out,
apologized for his past conduct, and embarked upon an abusive
campaign to convince Sed to sell drugs to Poulos. Sed
repeatedly claimed that this rapprochement occurred in 2006 at
Sed’s place of employment, Lone Star Mortgage. But when the
prosecutor confronted Sed with the fact that he had stopped
working at Lone Star in 2003, Sed changed his story to say that
the reconciliation occurred at Lone Star in 2003, or at some
point “after [Offie] was arrested in Ohio and Pennsylvania.”
When the government pointed out that Offie was not arrested
until 2005, Sed simply claimed to have been “in a very cloudy
state in my—my mind.” In addition, the wiretap recordings of
many of his negotiations with Offie and Poulos also contradicted
Sed’s portrait of himself as a reluctant, first-time drug dealer.
In these negotiations, Sed raised the possibility of future drug
transactions with Poulos, stated that he had previously engaged
in drug sales involving up to $20,000, made representations as
to the quality of the crack he would sell Poulos, and at one point
suggested a much larger sale, which Poulos himself declined as
too ambitious. Sed wrote these comments off as mere “puffery,”
but the District Court was not required to believe that
explanation.
As for sentencing factor manipulation, its broadest
formulation holds that it is “a violation of the Due Process
Clause,” Torres, 563 F.3d at 734, that “occurs when the
government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s sentencing
range by engaging in a longer-than-needed investigation and,
thus, increasing the drug quantities for which the defendant is
responsible.” Id.
13

Here, Sed complains that the police had sufficient
evidence to arrest him, Grannison, and Hickman after the first
controlled purchase. According to Sed, the decision of the
Pennsylvania State Police to arrange for a second, larger deal
instead of arresting Sed right away was sufficiently outrageous
to violate the Due Process Clause. We have stated previously
that it is not a violation of due process for the police to
“intentionally delay[] [a] sting operation” in an effort to subject
a suspect to a greater penalty. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d at 476 n.13.
Likewise, other courts of appeals have held that it does not
offend due process for the police to “persist in ascertaining what
quantity [of drugs a defendant is] willing and able to deal,”
United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993), and
“that the ultimate seizure of a larger quantity of illegal drugs
from a suspect in connection with the arrest has positive societal
consequences; eradicating illegal drugs from society is a
legitimate, if not the primary, goal of drug enforcement
officials,” United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 965 (10th Cir.
1996). We agree with these precedents, and hold that Sed’s due
process rights were not violated when the Pennsylvania State
Police arranged the second controlled purchase in an effort to
reveal the extent to which Sed, Grannison, and Hickman were
willing to traffic in crack cocaine. For this reason, Sed cannot
establish a defense of sentencing factor manipulation, even if we
were to adopt the doctrine.
In sum, the record amply supports the District Court’s
conclusion that Sed perjured himself regarding his supposed
lack of predisposition to sell crack cocaine and the Pennsylvania
State Police did not act improperly in conducting their sting
operation. Absent these essential factual predicates for Sed’s
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claims of sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor
manipulation, it follows that the District Court did not err when
it failed to grant him a downward departure or an additional
downward variance on these grounds.
IV.
Having found no error by the District Court, we will
affirm Sed’s judgment of conviction and sentence.

15

